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In the age of globalization, the question whether inequality in the world rose or fell down, is 
a hot topic. Leading scholars in the field of economic inequality measurement developed 
methods to estimate empirically the distribution of welfare (income) amongst world 
citizens. Despite their similar methodologies, they do not seem to agree about the 
conclusion. In the present paper we pinpoint what drives the two extreme positions apart. 
Sala-i-Martin (2002a, b), who claims that there can be no doubt that world inequality went 
down between the late 1970s and the late 1990s, has in fact calculated population weighted 
inequality between countries. Milanovic (2002a, b, c) does not deny this, but illustrates the 
empirical importance of divergent tendencies at the sub-national level (especially urban 
versus rural regions) for assessing true world inequality and comes to the reverse 
conclusion. Nevertheless, there seems to be unanimity, especially amongst the contributions 
quoted here, about the inequality measure(s) to be used for assessing world income 
distributions. We show that at least for international inequality, there is empirical evidence 
for rank reversals among the class of generalized entropy measures and expect the same to 
be true of world inequality. However, the normative debate about which inequality measure 
to use for assessing true world inequality has not yet begun. 
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1 Introduction 
Assessing the welfare or income inequality amongst world citizens has been since at 
least as long as Theil’s (1979) pioneering contribution, a major concern of welfare 
economists (see a.o. Whalley 1979; Berry et al. 1983; Chotikapanich et al. 1997; 
Schultz 1998; Bourguignon and Morrisson 2002; Milanovic 2002a). At least some of 
these contributions have fed the (political) world with alarming reports stating that: 
‘The richest 1% of people in the world receive as much as the bottom 57%, or in other 
words, less than 50 million income-richest people receive as much as 2.7 billion poor.’ 
‘An American having the average income of the bottom US decile is better-off than 2/3 of 
world population.’ 
‘The ratio between average income of the world top 5% and the world bottom 5% increased 
from 78 to 1 in 1988, to 114 to 1 in 1993.’ 
‘75% of world population receive 25% of world $PPP income; and the reverse.’ 
(Milanovic 2002a: 88-89). 
More recently, the subject received attention from (endogenous) growth theorists (Quah 
1996, 1997). Among them, a most provocative contribution came from Sala-i-Martin 
(2002a, b), challenging views as the ones quoted above as not being warranted by the 
empirical facts: 
‘The result is striking: rather than a steady increase in inequality, the population weighted 
variance has fallen during the last two decades. When considering individuals rather than 
countries, the evidence does not show “divergence, big time”, but “convergence, period”.’ 
(Sala-i-Martin 2002a: 7-8). 
Despite a vigour rarely seen amongst academics,1 there seems to be little or no 
divergence of opinion about the bare facts which gave rise to it, as we will argue below 
(section 5). Both report for example that the recent prolonged period of growth of 
China’s mean income, had a major inequality reducing effect. On the other hand, the 
battery of inequality measures used by these authors do not rank always unanimously 
the same facts. Without claiming any original contribution in this sense, we simply 
establish that astonishingly little has been said about those normative issues in this 
application of inequality measurement, probably because of the hidden unanimity about 
the evidence. Rather than using similar value judgements to assess different data-sets, as 
is done now, conceptually it seems more fruitful to us, to investigate whether different 
measures of inequality rank the same couple of income vectors to be compared, 
differently and why this would be so. 
In the present contribution we want to highlight some aspects of the debate between the 
‘convergence, period’ protagonists and those who believe that the world income 
distribution is characterized more and more by ‘twin peaks’ (poor-rich) and a 
disappearing middle class. More specifically, we want to explain how two major recent 
                                                 
1   See especially Milanovic (2002c).   2
contributions in the field (Milanovic 2002a and Sala-i-Martin 2002a) could reach such 
widely divergent conclusions. 
In the next section we discuss three concepts of inequality central to the subsequent 
analysis: 
−   ‘Concept I’:  divergence between countries, in terms of GDP per capita; 
−   ‘Concept II’:  population-weighted international inequality; 
−   ‘Concept III’: inequality among world citizens, the central issue of the literature 
we discuss. 
These concepts were thus baptized by Milanovic (2002b). 
Section 3 reviews the differences in data and methodology used by Milanovic versus 
Sala-i-Martin. Section 4 discusses their results and conclusions. Section 5 then 
confronts these results and explains their (apparent) differences. 
2 Which  inequality? 
The interest of endogenous growth-theorists in the shape of world income distribution 
was originally motivated by the question whether the globalization of the world 
economy would lead to a convergence of nations (countries) in terms of GDP per 
capita. In their language there is said to be σ -convergence ‘if the dispersion [of per 
capita GDP] – measured, for example, by the standard deviation of the logarithm of per 
capita income or product, across a group of countries or regions – declines over time’ 
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995: 383). There is an immediate double link here with the 
inequality literature. First, the quotation above refers to what has been defined above as 
‘Concept I inequality’. Second, the standard deviation of the logs is a well-known 
inequality index in the economic literature (Foster and Sen 1997: 328-329), although it 
does not satisfy the core property of inequality measurement: the so-called Pigou-
Dalton criterion (since there are cases where a small rich to poor transfer increases 
inequality according to that measure). 
From a welfare theoretic point of view however, this ‘Concept I inequality’ has the 
drawback of considering every country on an equal footing, irrespective of its size in 
terms of population. Consider the following two vectors of incomes, each consisting of 
only two different income values, €100 and €1000: 
vector A:  4 4 43 4 4 42 1 4 4 4 43 4 4 4 42 1
times 4 times 6
1000 , 1000 , 1000 , 1000 , 100 , 100 , 100 , 100 , 100 , 100  
vector B:  1000 , 100 ....., .......... .......... .......... .......... ,......... 100
times 99
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 43 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 42 1 , 
and assume the €100-earners in both cases belong to one and the same country X, while 
€1000 earners all live in another country Y.   3
Many people would find income distribution A, in which six out of ten persons earn an 
income of €100, while the other four earn €1000, as more unequal than vector B, 
irrespective of the information on the country to which the income earners belong. 
Indeed, in the latter distribution the bulk of people, say 99 out of 100, earn the same 
€100, while the remaining, now almost negligible (in population size but not in terms of 
inequality) part earns €1000. Yet, in ‘Concept I inequality’ both income distributions 
are described simply by means of the vector of two elements: (100, 1000). Something 
similar happens if one counts populated poor countries such as Bangladesh, India and 
China (who constitute respectively 2.2 per cent, 16.8 per cent and 21.1 per cent of total 
world population in 1999) on an equal footing, in terms of population, with, say for 
example, Belgium (0.17 per cent of world population in 1999).2 
Of course, the example suggests that the deficiency of ‘Concept I inequality’ is easily 
cured by weighting the vector (100, 1000) by the respective populations receiving one 
of both incomes. This leads us to ‘Concept II inequality’, which is particularly well 
suited to measure inequality between groups of people. This is something different than 
inequality among nations or countries, since we take into account how densely 
populated those different nations are. In fact, contrary to what happens in ‘Concept I 
inequality’, every world citizen now counts for one. If we are interested, for example, in 
the inequality between Africa and Western Europe, this second concept is perfectly well 
suited, since it takes into account population size, which plays a role, as we saw by the 
example above. 
But the issue of the present paper, and the debate it refers to, concern the measurement 
of income inequality among world citizens. This ‘Concept III inequality’ considers the 
distribution of income across individuals, irrespective of the country where people live. 
In this concept, every world citizen counts for one, and the income distribution is one 
long vector of (in 1999) about 6 billion entries. 
2.1  Linking ‘Concept II’ and ‘Concept III’ 
In some views on economic inequality, ‘Concept II’- and ‘Concept III’-inequality are 
related. We already noticed that population-weighted international inequality counts 
every world citizen as one. But it does not (and does not intend to) take into account 
within  country inequality, being the inequality within a country, irrespective of the 
income that the rest of world’s citizens obtain. Neglecting within country inequality 
means that every individual is treated as if they had the mean income of the country or 
region they belong to. Only differences in mean incomes between countries or regions 
and their respective population sizes play a role. If one accepts that total inequality can 
exactly be broken up in a between group (‘Concept II’-type) and a within group 
component, in the way just defined, one should add to ‘Concept II inequality’ (the 
between component) an aggregate of the inequality within countries or regions to arrive 
at ‘Concept III inequality’ (total inequality between all world citizens). Exactly this 
property was in a more general fashion developed in the literature on decomposability 
of inequality measures (Bourguignon 1979; Shorrocks 1980). 
                                                 
2  All figures which are not stemming from quoted sources are based on the World Development 
Indicators (WDI), a database compiled by the World Bank. For more information, see 
http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2003/index.htm.   4
However, not all inequality concepts agree that global inequality can exactly be broken 
up in a between and a within part. The most famous example is the celebrated Gini-
inequality ranking. Indeed, if one tries, as one does under decomposability, to build up 
total inequality between individuals from information on inequality within certain 
groups and inequality between those groups, one deliberately gives up the information 
about the place of an individual income in the global income distribution. For example, 
if one really wants to take into account where the top decile incomes of China are 
situated as compared to the bottom decile incomes in Western Europe, then a 
decomposable measure will not do the job. A decomposable measure only relates the 
regions through their mean incomes, and adds to this the relative position of the top 
decile incomes in China with respect to the other deciles in China. The lack of 
decomposability of the Gini exactly follows from the fact that each individual income in 
China is compared with all other individual incomes in the world. 
We illustrate the three concepts central in the empirical literature on measuring world 
income inequality and their (possible) interrelationships for two frequently used 
inequality measures: the Gini coefficient and the Theil measure.3 
Let us introduce some notation:  ih y  denotes the income of an individual i belonging to 
a group h, containing  h n  members; the income distribution in group h then is denoted 
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where we use the subscript 1 to refer to ‘Concept I inequality’. The population sizes do 
not enter the picture. Each country is weighted equally, irrespective of its population 
size, and inequality is only built upon differences in average incomes. For ‘Concept II 
                                                 
3  Only for these two measures we will, in section 4, give numerical calculations from the literature.   5
inequality’ we introduce the population shares, and replace the average of group mean 

































































































=  (5) 
Total inequality between world citizens is decomposable in a between term (B), which is 
‘Concept II inequality’ or population weighted international inequality, and a weighted 
sum of within country inequalities (W). In case of the Theil coefficient the weights are 
the income shares. 
Let us now look at the case of the Gini coefficient, which is not decomposable. For the 


















































































3 , (10) 
can only be written if the income distribution and the group definition is such that there 
are no overlaps between incomes of the different groups in society. 
If this does not hold, that means, if, for example, the richest of the poorest group is 
richer than the poorest of the next to poorest group, then (10), which writes the ‘global 
Gini’ as the sum of ‘within Gini’s’ and a ‘between Gini’, does not hold. Of course, one 













=  (11) 
where R is the residual. 
Lambert and Aronson (1993) interpreted this residual term R as the contribution of the 
degree of overlap between the income distributions of different groups to overall 
inequality because it vanishes in case of absence of overlaps. Consequently, contrary to 
the Theil measure, the Gini inequality index does not allow to reconstruct ‘concept III 
inequality’ on the base of ‘concept II inequality’ and an aggregate of the within country 
inequalities. 
On the other hand, both inequality rankings discussed so far (Gini and Theil) satisfy the 
anonymity  principle (if any two people in the world exchange their income, global 
inequality remains unchanged), scale invariance (multiplying all incomes with a certain 
(positive) factor leaves inequality unchanged), population invariance (concatenating the 
current world income distribution with that of another world, of equal size and with the 
same income distribution, leaves inequality unchanged) and the Pigou-Dalton principle 
(a rich to poor transfer that does not lead to a rank reversal decreases inequality). 
Satisfying these four criteria is equivalent with what is known in the literature as Lorenz 
dominance: an income distribution is less unequal if the cumulative income share of the 
poorest  p% is higher for all  [] 100 , 0 ∈ p . Whenever the Gini and the Theil measure 
would give different results in ranking the same couple of income vectors, it could not 
be ascribed to any of these properties. 
In case one wants to add on top of this the just discussed criterion that we must be able 
to write ‘Concept III inequality’ as a function of ‘Concept II inequality’ and a within 
component alone, we are restricted to the generalized entropy class, of which the Theil   7
measure is a special case.4 So, differences in opinion on the evolution of inequality 
could follow from the acceptance or rejection of this decomposability property. 
2.2  Budget survey versus GDP per capita 
Until so far, we concentrated on the issue of which inequality concepts could shed light 
on the question of global world inequality, but didn’t specify – except for the general 
terms ‘income’ or ‘welfare’ – in what dimension one should measure inequality. Two 
conflicting views can be discerned in the literature, of which Sala-i-Martin (2002a) and 
Milanovic (2002a) can be considered as the respective proponents: either one uses 
income or expenditures from household budget surveys (which is mostly some kind of 
‘disposable income’), or one uses GDP as the appropriate income concept, the 
difference lying in the in- or exclusion of public goods. 
Sala-i-Martin (2002a) defends that an individual welfare measure should include the 
contributions of public goods (especially health and education might be important). 
Therefore, measures of welfare based on household income or expenditures should be 
corrected for the level of public spending. This is usually done by applying information 
on the income distribution – which we discuss in the next section – on GDP per capita 
figures. There is a second reason to sustain this approach: as it turns out, GDP-based 
measures of income tend to be higher than what one obtains from income surveys, the 
reason not only being the public goods, but that people tend to underestimate their 
income. 
For reasons of internal consistency, Milanovic (2002c: 14) uses the same source to 
determine overall mean income, and the distribution of income. Since GDP is by nature 
an aggregate measure, no distributional information can be retrieved from it, and 
household budget surveys with detailed micro-data on a representative sample of the 
population enter the scene. Moreover, he points out that the underestimation of income, 
referred to by Sala-i-Martin, comes in the first place from misreporting in the tails of the 
income distribution. Therefore using a GDP based measure would not be a good idea to 
correct for this, if one is interested in distributional issues. On top of this, and certainly 
for less recent years of observation, GDP-based measures of income mostly exclude an 
important source of welfare for poor (and hence many) people in developing countries: 
consumption from own produce. In most cases this home production is included in 
household surveys. 
If anything, GDP-based measures of global inequality are expected to produce higher 
figures, than measurement on the basis of income or expenditures, and this for two 
reasons: first of all the level of public goods is higher in countries with higher GDP (see 
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GE , where  +∞ ≤ ≤ ∞ − γ  and 
1 , 0 ≠ γ . As a special case, the Theil measure is the limit of this expression for  1 → γ . In general, 
the decomposition of the generalized entropy class of measures uses 
γ γ
h h s p
− 1  as weights in the 
‘within’-term (see Cowell and Kuga 1981; Shorrocks 1984).   8
Milanovic 2002a: 64-65). Secondly, home production and auto-consumption tends to be 
higher in poor economies. 
2.3  Purchasing Power Parity conversion 
Data, whether it are GDP-figures or household surveys on income or expenditures, are 
expressed in local currencies. The dollar remains the standard for data covering the 
whole world. Yet, it may be clear that a conversion of these figures in a common 
currency by means of an ordinary exchange rate (from local currency to dollar at the 
moment of observation) cannot serve as a good basis for welfare comparisons. Indeed, 
the purchasing power represented by a US$1 daily income (the poverty line in 1985 
calculated by Ravallion et al. (1991) is simply not the same when the dollar has to be 
spent in the US as compared to in Ethiopia. In the US you could hardly survive with this 
little amount of money, whereas in Ethiopia this income represents about the average 
daily income of someone employed. The Penn World Tables (Summers and Heston 
1991) contain time series of Purchasing Power Parity conversion rates into dollars 
(PPP$) for a large set of countries, some of them dating back to the 1950s. The 
conversion of local currency observations in comparable purchasing parity units by 
mean of these data, is indispensable for suitable welfare comparisons and by now 
common practice.5 
3  Data and methodology 
Clearly, measuring world inequality (‘Concept III inequality’) requires a huge amount 
of data. Just as in the case of measuring inequality in a specific country, one ideally 
needs a representative sample of observations on people’s income. However, the 
population now is world population. Contrary to what is the case in many countries, 
there is no statistical bureau which collects this type of information at the world level. 
The only solution is to make a detour and try to collect as much as possible information 
at national (or sub-national) levels, in order to compile on the basis of within country 
distributional information a large enough sample which covers a large enough fraction 
of the world in terms of population size. 
Information on national income distributions usually comes from household surveys 
conducted at the national level. In some Western countries, also the tax administration 
provides some information on the basis of administrative data, but we are far from 
having enough information from such sources. Moreover administrative data might, 
certainly in developing countries, miss some important parts of income: the virtual 
income represented by the value of home production and the incomes derived in the 
informal and black sectors of the economy (the latter might be poorly assessed through 
surveys too). Usually, the information on individual records of national level household 
surveys are not publicly available and come across by average income or income shares 
of certain quantiles or subgroups of the sample. One should therefore in one way or 
                                                 
5  This does not mean of course that the specific conversion into PPP$ proposed by Summers and 
Heston (1991) is uncontroversial. Dowrick and Akmal (2003) question the supposed declining 
‘Concept II inequality’ on the grounds of biases in the PPP conversion rates used in the Penn World 
Tables and propose an alternative conversion.   9
another construct an entire income distribution for the world from this sparse 
information.6 
There is some choice on how to reconstruct this distribution: some authors estimate a 
parametric (Chotikapanich et al. 1997) or nonparametric (Sala-i-Martin 2002b) form on 
the basis of the data-points. Another possibility is to assume that all individuals from the 
population which are covered by the sample data-point receive the same income. Take 
the case where we combine GDP per capita with distributional data. If one observes 
that the poorest 20 per cent Indonesian people obtain about 9 per cent of total income 
(in 1999) and GDP per capita is 2790$, then the best guess is to assume that all 20 per 
cent poorest Indonesians earn  $ 5 . 1255 2790 5 09 . 0 = × × . Out of necessity one neglects 
the inequality within that group. Irrespective of whether the decomposability property is 
accepted, one could easily derive from the previous section that this amounts then to an 
underestimation of true world inequality. In fact, starting from the constructed 
distribution, one can obtain the true world income distribution after some regressive 
Pigou-Dalton transfers. 
Question is whether this underestimation is worrying. From the literature (Davies and 
Shorrocks 1989) and empirical practice it is well known that at least a Gini-index can be 
estimated quite accurately from 6 to 7 data-points, provided that these are optimally 
selected. Reconstructing the true world from available data is however more complex 
than assessing an income distribution from few, but optimally chosen data-points, for at 
least two reasons. Firstly, the recovering of the true world income distribution has to be 
accomplished by constructing first a true income distribution per country on the base of 
some sparse data-points, and there are about 100 such countries in the authors’ 
respective datasets. The true world income distribution is then composed by putting 
together those estimated country-distributions. The second complication follows from 
the first one. Working with distributional information per country implies that some 
data-points, namely those stemming from highly populated countries, cover a significant 
fraction of the world income distribution7 and one risks, therefore, to loose too much 
information on the inequality within the group of people represented by those 
observations. 
Milanovic’s (2002a) ‘objective is that the number of such data-points be at least ten in 
order to have a sufficiently precise description of a distribution’ (p. 56). He obtained his 
distributional information from a set of household surveys which he collected from 
different sources (the Luxembourg Income Study for Western Europe and North 
America, the Living Standard Measurement and other surveys of the World Bank for 
third world countries, and for the transition economies in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union the Household Expenditure and Income Database for Transitional 
                                                 
6  One should distinguish this from scaling up the information from the sample level to the population 
level. One could reliably estimate the population parameters on the basis of sample information if the 
sample is representative for the population. Usually a sample contains relevant weighting factors for 
each observation unit, in order to perform the scaling up correctly. 
7  Milanovic’s (1993) largest data point stems from a rural region in China covering 180 million people, 
or about 3.3 per cent of world population at that time. In Sala-i-Martin (2002a, b), there must be at 
least five data-points with over 4 per cent of world population.   10
Economies was consulted).8 He was able to obtain such information for a sample of 91 
‘countries’ both in 1988 and 1993, covering about 84 per cent of the world population. 
For about three-quarters of the cases, Milanovic was able to obtain individual records. 
He converted these into decile data. Moreover, he decided to create some ‘sub-
countries’ by considering the rural and urban part of populous Asian countries as 
separate observation units. He used the rural/urban divide for China, India, Bangladesh, 
and Indonesia in both 1988 and 1993, and for Pakistan in 1988. To be sure, sometimes 
Milanovic (2002a) had to revert to surveys which were not conducted in the two years 
which form the focus of his attention (1988 and 1993), but in a close neighbourhood. 
And in 12 exceptional occasions in 1988 (mainly for countries which originated from 
the former Soviet Union), he had to be satisfied with quintile data-points only. 
Sala-i-Martin (2002a, b) wants to calculate world income inequality from 1970 onwards 
on a yearly base. Evidently, this is a much more ambitious project. He therefore reverts 
to the Deininger and Squire (1996) data-base, which contains for a large set of 
countries, information on income shares of quintiles for some specific years (not the 
same for all countries) between 1947 and 1993.9 So the price to be paid for this 
ambitious undertaking is not only sparser data (five data points per country instead of 11 
on average in Milanovic 2002a), but also more fragmentary data (no information in 
specific years).10 To solve the latter problem, he estimated a linear time trend through 
the shares for countries for which several observations between 1970 and 1998 were 
available. He then used the estimated shares to calculate inequality.11 For countries 
which were not in that case (only one observation on income distribution during 1970-
1998), it was assumed that inequality did not change throughout. This was the case for 
29 countries, comprising 6 per cent of the sample population. Finally, for another 28 
countries (also representing 6 per cent of the sample population), there was no 
distributional information at all. In that case, as for example for the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, it was assumed that everybody had the same income. In this way, 
Sala-i-Martin compiled a data-set with distributional information on 125 countries, 
covering 88 per cent of the world population in 1998. A major difference with 
Milanovic’s coverage is that Sala-i-Martin does not include countries from Eastern 
Europe or the former Soviet Union. 
Once they obtained (or constructed) this distributional information in the forms of 
income shares, both authors apply these shares to the welfare concept they have chosen: 
GDP per capita for Sala-i-Martin (2002a), income or expenditures from surveys for 
Milanovic (2002a). They both refrain from estimating a functional form of the 
distribution function, considering this a too constraining straitjacket from an empirical 
                                                 
8 More detailed information on the data sources of Milanovic (2002a) can be found on 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/inequality/data.htm. 
9  Sala-i-Martin (2002a) mentions that he uses the extension of the Deininger and Squire (1996) database 
provided by the World Bank, known as the World Development Indicators, but it was not clear to us 
which version of this database provides distributional information. 
10 The terminology ‘sparse’ and ‘fragmentary’ data stems from Milanovic (2002c). 
11 In a companion paper, Sala-i-Martin (2002b) estimated kernel densities on the base of quintile points 
to generate a more complete picture of the distribution, but the results of this approach do not differ 
substantially from Sala-i-Martin (2002a), and so we concentrate further exclusively on the latter.   11
point of view. Instead, they assign to every world citizen of a given income group the 
same income as the income observed in the data-point. 
For the conversion into comparable monetary units, Sala-i-Martin (2002a) uses real 
PPP$ figures as presented by Heston et al. (2001). Milanovic (2002a) uses the nominal 
PPP$ conversion rates of the same source to convert his data points (mean incomes of 
groups or quantiles) into comparable units. Since both authors use ray invariant 
concepts of inequality, the difference between real and nominal is not important, once 
the figures have been converted into common dollars. 
Table 1 summarizes the main differences in the data and methodology between the two 
authors. 
Table 1 
Data sources and coverage of Sala-i-Martin (2002a, b) and Milanovic (2002a, b) 
 Sala-i-Martin  Milanovic 
Time period  1970-1998  1988 and 1993 
Observation unit  countries  countries, but rural/urban split up 
for 
−  China,  India,  Bangladesh, 
and Indonesia in 1988 and 
1993 
−  Pakistan  in  1988 
Number of units  125  91 
% of world population  88% in 1998  84% in 1988 and 1993 
Distributional information  Deininger and Squire (1996) and 
extension with World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank 
household surveys 
Number of datapoints  quintiles  varying, but ≥  10; 
on average 10.8 in 1988 and 11.4 
in 1993; 
12 exceptions in 1988 (only 
quintiles) 
Welfare concept  GDP per capita  income or expenditures (depending 
on the source) 
Source  Penn World Tables of Heston, 
Summers and Aten (2001) 
national household surveys 
collected by the author 
Currency  real, 1996 PPP$  nominal PPP$ 
4 Results 
Table 2 summarizes the results of both authors. For Sala-i-Martin we have taken the 
figures bearing on the same time period 1988-1993 of Milanovic.   12
Table 2 
Gini and Theil indices for global world inequality 
 Sala-i-Martin  (2002a:  60-61, 
tables 1 and 2) 
Milanovic (2002a: 78, table 19) 
  1988  1993 change 1988  1993 change 
Gini  
Overall 0.627  0.615  ↓   0.628 0.660  ↑  
Between (sub)countries  0.507  0.496  ↓   0.551 0.578  ↑  
Within     ↓   0.013 0.013  - 
Overlap      0.064  0.068  ↑  
Theil  
Overall 0.767  0.729  ↓   0.765 0.873  ↑  
Between (sub)countries  0.574  0.533  ↓   0.571 0.649  ↑  
Within 0.193  0.196  ↑   0.194 0.224  ↑  
 
Let us first look at the global picture by means of overall or ‘Concept III inequality’. 
The difference is striking. Milanovic finds a definite increase in inequality. For Sala-i-
Martin the ‘disturbing rise’ in world inequality is more apparent than fact: he finds a 
clear decrease during this same period. This conflicting evidence holds both for the Gini 
and the Theil-index. 
Note that there is a striking resemblance between both authors as far as inequality in 
1988 is concerned. Yet, this is not that good news. Indeed, as we explained above, both 
authors use a different welfare concept, and we would expect Sala-i-Martin, using GDP 
per capita, to find higher inequality figures. We come back to this issue in the next 
section, where we try to explain the difference. 
Stepping into the decomposition methodology, both authors agree that the largest part of 
‘Concept III inequality’ is explained by the contribution of the between component. 
Both authors agree that the growth of mean income in China and, to a lesser extent, 
India tends to decrease world inequality. Indeed, faster growth of a poorer country 
(China grows faster than Western Europe/US/Japan) can be translated into a 
combination of a Pigou-Dalton transfer from richer to poorer countries and then 
rescaling. Since both authors use Lorenz-consistent inequality concepts, one can 
understand agreement on the conclusions in this respect. But they obtain opposite 
results on the total change of the between country inequality component. This 
divergence in results for the between component is most intriguing. The difference will 
be explained in the next section. Notice that the continuing growth of China and India, 
in the end would tend to increase inequality again (because the divergence with poor 
Africa and Asia will dominate then the convergence of both China and India to the 
richer part of the world). But apparently we have not yet reached this turning point. 
For the within component, we have to make a distinction between the results obtained 
by means of the decomposable Theil and the non-decomposable Gini coefficient. 
According to Milanovic, also the within component increases if one agrees to use the 
decomposability property embedded in the Theil measure. Hence the rise in overall   13
inequality can be explained by both between and within components. But if one rejects 
the latter property (as in the case of the Gini) there is no evidence that within country 
inequality has contributed to the rise in equality. The rise in overall inequality is 
explained by an increase in the between component and the overlap of the distributions. 
Only in case he uses the Theil index, Sala-i-Martin admits that within inequality has 
risen, but not enough to counterbalance the falling tendency in the between component. 
If he decomposes the Gini, we can infer that the sum of the within component and the 
rest term must have gone down (slightly), but we have no information on the relative 
contribution of overlap and within in Sala-i-Martin. 
Summing up, the results of both authors are surprisingly divergent. The more because 
they use the same indices, more or less the same methodology, and roughly the same 
data. More than time, therefore, to step into the section that tries to explain where the 
divergence comes from. 
5  Quarrelling about facts, silence about norms 
5.1 Three  suspects 
The first suspect for the opposite results is of course the fact that average incomes (the 
size of the cake) are quite different when measured in household surveys or by GDP per 
capita. We will not repeat the discussions and arguments for preferring one above the 
other. But recently, Milanovic (2002b) himself offered convincing evidence that this 
first suspect is not to blame. He rescaled the average incomes of the surveys, used for 
the distributional information, to the level of the GDP per capita for each country in the 
years under consideration. We replicate his results in Table 3. Note first that the 
hypothesis, formulated in section 2, that using GDP per capita instead of household 
budget survey averages, would increase the level of inequality is confirmed for 1988. 
Compared to the result in Table 2, the Gini in 1988 goes up from 0.628 to 0.633. 
However, this is not the case for the Theil in 1993 (and Milanovic does not give an 
explanation for this).12 But the main conclusion of this exercise is that inequality still 
increases, and the contradiction with Sala-i-Martin remains unexplained. Remarkably, 
the overlap term in the Gini coeffient now goes down. This might be explained by the 
fact that average GDP’s per capita tend to lie further apart than mean household 
incomes, which causes a tendency towards less overlaps. 
                                                 
12  Since the Theil measure is known to give some more attention to rather high incomes, we could infer 
that incomes in this spectrum of the global distribution have become closer than when constructed 
from mean expenditures/incomes.   14
Table 3 
‘Concept III inequality’ from survey data with average rescaled to GDP/capita 
(Milanovic 2002b: 88, Table 28) 
 1988  1993  Change 
Gini  
Overall 0.633  0.639  ↑  
Between subcountries  0.561  0.576  ↑  
Within 0.013  0.013  - 
Overlap 0.059  0.050  ↓  
Theil  
Overall 0.778  0.847  ↑  
Between subcountries  0.584  0.621  ↑  
Within 0.194  0.226  ↑  
 
A second possible explanation might lie in the omission by Sala-i-Martin  of the 
countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. There is ample evidence that, 
definitely in the period 1988-1993, these countries have experienced a huge increase of 
inequality (see, for example, Milanovic 1998). But, of course, this increase in within 
country inequality cannot explain the divergence in the results for the between 
component. And as was clear from Table 2, this was by far the most important effect. 
Moreover, although the total effect on world inequality of the increase in inequality in 
these countries might be positive, the serious drop in the average income of these 
countries also exercised a reverse effect. The collapse of these ‘poorer rich countries’, 
and the fast growth of some richer poor countries, produced some convergence of mean 
incomes. More specifically the convergence of the mean income of China and India to 
the one of Russia and Ukraine pushed the Gini down with between 0.3 and 0.12 points 
(Milanovic 2002a: 84-85, table 22). 
So, let us examine a third suspect: the distributional information itself. It is difficult to 
deny that Sala-i-Martin seems to be satisfied with less demanding distributional 
information. That he does not find an important contribution from within inequality 
undoubtedly is partly influenced by the fact that he only works with quintile shares. In 
general, quintiles give too poor information on the within country distribution. This 
holds all the more so for densely populated data-points like China, India and 
Bangladesh. Moreover the way he linearly interpolates the data for years where the 
information is lacking, in practice leads to a constructed lack of variation in his within 
component. As Milanovic (2002c: 16) shows, the constant character of Sala-i-Martin’s 
within component is not a coincidence, but points to the fact that his calculations 
practically reduce to the calculation of the between component (‘Concept II inequality’) 
augmented with a constant term. This is confirmed by Milanovic’s (2002b: 90) own 
calculations of ‘Concept II inequality’, based on GDP per capita: the Gini goes down 
from 52.5 to 51.2 and for the Theil, he obtains a decline from 0.623 to 0.565 (see 
Table 4).   15
5.2  A spurious controversy 
None of the three suspects, examined so far, can explain the divergence in the 
conclusion about the between term of the inequality change. Yet, one other experiment 
by Milanovic provides the key. The information is in Table 4: instead of working with 
his own data, that subdivided China, India, Indonesia and Bangladesh into rural and 
urban subgroupings, he lumped them together into ‘whole’ countries, just as Sala-i-
Martin did (and most other authors do). The result is striking, and confirms our 
dismissing of the other three possible explanations. When he calculates the between 
component on the distributional information of the surveys, with an average income 
rescaled to GDP per capita, but with countries comparable to Sala-i-Martin’s definition, 
then he obtains a negative contribution to overall inequality of the between component 
for the Gini (as compared to the positive contribution before!), and a much smaller 
positive contribution in case of the Theil. 
Table 4 
Between component of ‘concept III inequality’ from survey data, with average rescaled to 
GDP/capita and ‘concept II inequality’ (Milanovic 2002b: 90, table 29) 
  With urban/rural divide of 
the data for China, India, 
Indonesia, Bangladesh 
Whole countries  ‘Concept II inequality’ 
 1988  1993  change 1988  1993  change  1988  1993  change 
Gini 0.561  0.576  ↑   0.551 0.541  ↓   0.525 0.512  ↓  
Theil 0.584  0.621  ↑   0.558 0.567  ↑   0.623 0.565  ↓  
 
This is revealing of course. The splitting up of countries in large regions, largely 
improves the within country distributional information of China, India and Bangladesh 
(Pakistan was split in 1988, not in 1983). Working with whole countries, it is not 
surprising that Sala-i-Martin misses a lot of within country inequality. The biggest 
contribution to the rise in inequality in Milanovic’s figures comes from the increasing 
divergence, not only between rural China and India on the one hand and urban China on 
the other, but also between the former and some fast growing richer countries (Japan, 
Germany and to a lesser extent France and the United States) (Milanovic 2002a: 86, 
table 23). 
The fact that both authors seem to agree that it is the ‘between’ component which is the 
driving force behind the change, is therefore non telling at all. Their between 
component is simply not comparable. The increase in inequality, found by Milanovic, 
and stemming in the first place from a ‘between’ component, is, at least in terms of the 
‘normal’ definition of countries, a ‘within’ component. And the between component 
turns out to have a negative or a much smaller positive contribution to overall 
inequality, if one lets the groups coincide with the ‘normal’ country definition. We 
therefore consider the controversy (or at least this aspect of it) to be more apparent than 
real.   16
5.3  On ‘Concept III’, the controversy is empirical 
More generally stated, our conclusion would be that, if one wants to measure true world 
inequality on the basis of sparse data, it is not a good idea to start from ‘Concept II-
inequality’. Surely not if it is calculated on the basis of the largely arbitrary definitions 
of countries as states. The problem does not seem to be sparse data as such. Sparse data 
do allow you to compute overall inequality rather exactly. But one does need a critical 
amount of data-points; and one has to examine first critically the data-points 
representing large parts of the world population. Using accessible empirical information 
on the urban/rural divergence in, for example, China and India, allows Milanovic to 
derive that representing the whole of China or India’s distribution by means of quintiles 
is unwarranted. In this respect, it seems that Milanovic gets a better, more accurate, 
estimation of true world inequality. 
There is one minor caveat here. The finer distributional information of Milanovic is not 
constant over time. Between 1988 and 1993, the average number of data-points 
increases from 10.8 to 11.4, and, maybe more importantly, for 12 countries (mainly 
from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union) with only poor quintile information 
in 1988, at least ten data-points were obtained in 1993. This might have pushed 
Milanovic’s results a little bit in the upward direction, revealing however not a true 
increase in inequality, but a better perception over time of possibly unchanged 
inequality. 
Note that our conclusion of ‘Concept II’ as a nonstarter for assessing true world 
inequality, is mainly an empirical statement, and has nothing to do with the acceptance 
or rejection of decomposability as an attractive property. Both authors give results for 
decomposable and non-decomposable inequality concepts, though Milanovic clearly 
prefers the non-decomposable Gini above the decomposable Theil coefficients. But 
decomposability per se is a property of the inequality ranking, not of the facts. Indeed, 
even decomposable inequality concepts can rank the world distribution in 1993 and 
1988 differently, but apparently this is not the case here. 
5.4  An almost forgotten normative rejoinder 
The negative contribution of the between component in the change of overall inequality, 
becomes even clearer if one looks at the last three columns of table 4, which gives 
Milanovic’s results for population weighted international inequality (‘Concept II 
inequality’) on the basis of a much larger sample (122 countries instead of 87). 
Population weighted international inequality definitely has gone down, a result pefectly 
in line with Sala-i-Martin’s findings. If one adds to this the fact that Sala-i-Martin 
essentially adds a constant to this information, we can understand his results. 
Hence, one thing seems clear: ‘Concept II inequality’ (between nations) seems to have 
unambiguously fallen the last couple of decades (and especially between 1988 and 
1993). Many, though not all contributions in the literature seem to confirm this finding 
of both Milanovic (2002b) and Sala-i-Martin (2002a, b). A noteworthy exception is 
Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002). They obtain increasing between country inequality 
from 1980 to 1992 for the Theil index. However, once again the definition of the groups 
might be important: their countries are in fact groups of countries (larger units than 
Sala-i-Martin), and they defined groups in such a way that the member states are   17
roughly homogeneous, which might explain the observed increase in heterogeneity 
(inequality) between regions. 
Remarkably, the same source (Bourguignon and Morrisson 2002: 734, table 2) reports 
decreasing international inequality for the mean logarithmic deviation.13 Precisely this 
kind of rank reversals when comparing the same couple of income distributions with 
different inequality indices, have been a prominent issue in the literature of the past 
decades (Atkinson 1970; Sen 1973; Kakwani 1984, among many others). Therefore it is 
all the more remarkable that, as far as this topic is concerned, so little can be learnt from 
the literature reviewed here. What’s more, the data even seem to suggest that welfare 
economists would not agree about the evolution of international inequality over time, 
even if they would agree about the figures. In Table 5 we give the results from our own 
calculations of ‘Concept II inequality’ between 1991 and 1999 measured by the 
generalized entropy indices with  {} 5 4 1 0 1 4 5 , , , , , , , , L L − − − ∈ γ . We used a sample of 
158 countries representing 96.2 per cent of the world population in 1999.14 We obtain 
essentially the same results as Milanovic (2002b) and Sala-i-Martin (2002a, b): 
decreasing population weighted international inequality for  2 , 1 , 0 = γ . But, widening the 
normative scope, this unanimous picture disappears for  3 − ≤ γ  and  3 > γ . Normative 
differences in opinion determine whether one concludes that population weighted 
international inequality has risen or the other way around. 
Table 5 
Population weighted international or ‘concept II’ inequality 1991-99 on the base of World 
Development Indicators 
  value of the parameter γ  in the generalized entropy class 
Year  -5 -4  -3  -2  -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
1991 156.56 26.14  5.77  1.85 0.88 0.61 0.59 0.78 1.32 2.75 6.70 
1992 190.01 29.31  5.96  1.80 0.85 0.59 0.58 0.78 1.34 2.83 6.98 
1993 158.89 25.35  5.34  1.66 0.80 0.57 0.57 0.77 1.33 2.83 7.06 
1994 197.56 29.45  5.77  1.68 0.79 0.56 0.56 0.77 1.34 2.87 7.20 
1995 205.11 30.22  5.80  1.65 0.76 0.54 0.55 0.75 1.30 2.77 6.87 
1996 217.49 31.71  5.97  1.66 0.75 0.53 0.54 0.74 1.28 2.73 6.77 
1997 248.15 34.89  6.33  1.70 0.75 0.53 0.54 0.73 1.28 2.73 6.82 
1998 268.16 37.18  6.60  1.72 0.75 0.52 0.53 0.73 1.29 2.79 7.02 
1999 312.66 41.50  7.05  1.77 0.75 0.52 0.53 0.73 1.29 2.78 7.05 
 
Which normative opinions lie behind the choice of the parameter γ ? A higher γ  tends 
to give more weight to transfers at the top of the income distribution and vice versa. At 
the lower end of the world income distribution, one might consider the growth of 
                                                 
13  The mean logarithmic deviation corresponds to the limit of the generalized entropy index for  0 → γ . 
14    We used current PPP$ GDP per capita and population figures from the World Development 
Indicators 2003 (WDI) database (http://www.publications.worldbank.org/WDI/).   18
(urban) China and India vis-à-vis the rest of the poor as a regressive Pigou-Dalton 
transfer. At the other end, divergence between Eastern European countries and the rich 
countries is again an anti-Dalton transfer. Putting both these changes in the distribution 
together, might be interpreted as a convergence of the rich poor and the poor rich. 
However, an additional Pigou-Dalton transfer between (urban) China and India on the 
one hand and Eastern European countries on the other hand, might overrule the negative 
effect of those anti-Dalton transfers. If the evolution of the world income distribution 
can indeed be sketched by a combination of anti-Dalton transfers at the top and bottom, 
counterveiled by a Pigou-Dalton transfer in the middle, this might explain the observed 
fall in inequality for moderate values of γ , while one would perceive an increase in 
inequality for extreme values of γ  (as in Table 5). 
Finally, what do we conclude about the evolution of true world inequality (‘Concept 
III’) in this respect? Comparing two 6 billion long income vectors is a complex matter. 
We would have expected therefore that the data would leave ample space for normative 
differences of opinion. This is also what one learns from a closer look at the results of 
Sala-i-Martin’s (2002a: 61 table 2): despite a lack of emphasis for this finding from the 
author’s side (and even less an attempt to explain it), at least some rank reversals were 
obtained. For the period 1980-1989, for instance, the mean logarithmic deviation goes 
down, but the square of the coefficient of variation goes up.15 
Unexpectedly, Milanovic (2002a: 72-73) suggests that this problem would not occur 
with his data. Indeed, he obtains Lorenz dominance for the 1988 income distribution as 
compared to the 1993 distribution. In other words, all Lorenz consistent inequality 
indices (among which the Generalized Entropy class, and the Gini) would yield a higher 
value for 1993 as compared to 1988. The results of Table 5 reveal that Lorenz curves of 
population weighted inequality do intersect between 1991 and 1999. So, we feel 
justified to expect that Milanovic’s dominance result is vulnerable to the coarse grid he 
chose: while he has about 1000 observation points, dominance is only checked at 
percentiles. Many possibly statistically relevant crossings might remain hidden in that 
way. 
6 Conclusion 
In the present contribution, we tried to pinpoint down what drives the so widely 
divergent results in two recent contributions on the measurement of true world 
inequality. The first one claims that the frequently heard opinion about the ‘disturbing 
rise’ of inequality is unwarranted by the facts (Sala-i-Martin 2002a, b). At the other 
extreme, Milanovic (2002a, b) claims that the 1993 income distribution is Lorenz 
dominated by the 1988 world income distribution. 
We showed that it was neither the difference in welfare concept (GDP per capita versus 
income or expenditures) nor the sample (inclusion or not of the transition economies in 
Eastern Europe) that can be held responsible for the difference. 
                                                 
15  The squared coefficient of variation equals the generalized entropy index for  2 = γ .   19
In fact both authors agree that the growth in China, and to a lesser extent in India, had a 
big, inequality reducing effect on population weighted international inequality. But 
neglecting the big divergences within China and India between still very poor rural 
populations, the very fast growing urban areas and some good performing rich countries 
in terms of growth (Japan and Germany), may have led Sala-i-Martin to a perhaps too 
hasty conclusion that global inequality went down. 
And what about Africa? The continual low (and even negative) growth of many African 
countries gives rise to the suspicion that inequality will continue to rise. Moreover, the 
available information on Africa is still poor today, so that, on top of that, we also expect 
to observe better existing inequality on that continent in the near future. 
At least in the eyes of some. Because after all, we do not expect there to be unanimity 
among scholars in the field on such a complex issue as comparing two 6 billion long 
income vectors, with unequal means, and unequal length. Nevertheless the normative 
positions to tackle that job remained largely undiscussed up to now. 
Finally, the ongoing debate on the direction of (minor) changes in income inequality 
during the last decades should not make us blind for the fact this inequality remains to 
reach a disturbingly high level. 
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